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WHOM DO YOU TRUST? A Reply to Prof. Kahn
Concerning the Knight Case, also known as Rudkin
Trust
By Stephen B. Cohen
Tax Notes, Vol. 125, Nov. 9, 2009
Georgetown Law School Working Paper

In his 2008 opinion in Knight v. Commissioner,1 Chief Justice
John Roberts harshly criticized then Court of Appeals Judge Sonia
Sotomayor. Although Roberts affirmed the result of her second
circuit opinion in the case,2 he wrote that her approach to the Internal
Revenue Code “flies in the face of the statute.” In the August 3 issue
of Tax Notes, I argued that Roberts’ criticism of Sotomayor was
“logically flawed and unwarranted.”3 In the September 21 issue of
Tax Notes, Prof. Douglas Kahn defended Robert’s criticism of
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The name of the case before the second circuit was William L.
Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Commissioner.
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Sotomayor as “persuasive and accurate” and attacked Sotomayor’s
opinion in the case and my defense of what she wrote.4 For the
reasons explained below, I believe that Prof. Kahn’s arguments are
contestable and perhaps even untenable.
The Knight case involved Section 67(e)(1), which limits the
deduction of “costs which are paid or incurred in connection with the
administration of [an] estate or trust and which would not have been
incurred if the property were not held in such estate or trust.” The
issue was whether Section 67(e)(1) applies to a trust’s expenses for
investment advice.
Roberts construed the statute by reading the word “customarily”
into the second clause of Section 67(e)(1). According to Roberts,
Section 67(e)(1) applies if the costs would not customarily have been
incurred if the property were not held in trust.
On the other hand, Sotomayor interpreted the statute to mean
that Section 67(e)(1) applies if the costs could not have been incurred
if the property were not held in trust. In effect, she read the statute as
saying that Section 67(e)(1) applies if the costs would not ever have
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been incurred if the property were not held in trust. In effect, she
read the word “ever” rather than the word “customarily” into the
statute.
Roberts observed—and Prof. Kahn agreed—that Congress
might have substituted the word “could” for the word “ would” in the
statute but did not. Moreover, Roberts noted that the word “could” is,
as he put it, “highly accessible.” Therefore, he concluded,
Sotomayor’s reading of Section 67(e)(1) must be incorrect.
Of course, Congress might also have included the word
“customarily” in the statute but did not. Nevertheless, both Roberts
and Kahn apparently believe that the failure to include “customarily”
does not mean that Roberts’ reading is incorrect even though the
failure to substitute “could” for “would” does mean that Sotomayor’s
reading is wrong. Perhaps both Roberts and Prof. Kahn would
explain that the word “could” is more “accessible” to legislators than
the word “customarily.” Therefore, the failure to substitute “could” for
“would” is more meaningful than the failure to insert the word
“customarily.”
Even so, the use of “would” instead of “could” does not
necessarily mean that Congress rejected Sotomayor’s reading
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Section 67(e)(1). It might signify a lack of consciousness about the
ambiguity inherent in the statute as written. Or it might reflect a
legislative decision not to resolve this ambiguity and instead to allow
courts to determine more specifically how to apply the language. The
logical mistake of both Roberts and Kahn is assuming that a failure to
resolve the ambiguity through the use of the word “could” in place of
“would” necessarily implies a resolution of the ambiguity in one way
rather than another.
More generally, suppose that a statute in question is
ambiguous and could be read to mean either A or B. A decision by
Congress not to modify the language so that it clearly means A does
not necessarily imply that Congress means B.
Roberts also argued—and again Prof. Kahn agreed—that
Judge Sotomayor’s reading of the second clause in Section 67(e)(1)
would make the first clause superfluous. Roberts’ opinion stated:
If the only costs that are fully deductible are those that
could not be incurred outside the trust context-that is, that
could only be incurred by trusts-then there would be no
reason to place the further condition on full deductibility
that the costs be “paid or incurred in connection with the
administration of the . . . trust,”§ 67(e)(1). We can think of
no expense that could be incurred exclusively by a trust
but would nevertheless not be “paid or incurred in
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connection with” its administration.5
In my August 3 article, I argued that this criticism misread the
statutory scheme:
Section 67(e) divides all trust deductions into two
categories: (1) deductions for costs incurred in connection
with the administration of a trust; and (2) the standard
deduction and deductions for distributions to trust
beneficiaries. Section 67(e)(1) requires that deductions in
the first category (that is, deductions incurred in
connection with the administration of a trust) “would not
have been incurred if the property were not held in such
trust.” Section 67(e)(2), in contrast, does not impose
such a “would not have been incurred” requirement for
either the standard deduction or distributions to trust
beneficiaries. Thus, the purpose of the “paid or incurred
in connection with the administration of [a] trust” language
in the first clause of Section 67(e)(1) is to separate
deductions subject to the “would not have been incurred”
requirement from specified deductions under Section
67(e)(2) that are not subject to that requirement.
Prof. Kahn argued that I am mistaken because the limit on
deductions under Section 67(e)(1) applies only to “costs.” The
standard deduction and distributions to trust beneficiaries, he
continued, are not “costs in any sense” and therefore could never be
thought to be subject to the Section 67(e)(1) limits.
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A trust, however, might pay the expenses of its beneficiaries,
for example, for education or travel. These expenses would be, in
common parlance, costs incurred by the trust. They would not,
however, be costs incurred in the administration of trust property as
such and therefore should be fully deductible without limit. Thus, the
first clause in Section 67(e)(1) is not rendered superfluous by
Sotomayor’s reading of the statute. It is needed to confine the limits
on deductibility to administrative costs and to insure, for example, that
the trust’s payment of expenses of a beneficiary are fully deductible.
There is one other aspect of Prof. Kahn’s article that I find
puzzling. I cited, as significant, the fact that both the Treasury and
the Solicitor General endorsed Sotomayor’s reading of Section
67(e)(1). Prof. Kahn wrote:
Cohen’s view that approval of a court’s
holding by the winning party demonstrates the
validity of that holding is extraordinary to the
point of being bizarre.
Is it sensible, however, to equate the position taken by the
Treasury and the Solicitor General as no different from that of any
self-interested private litigant? The Treasury has a special interest in
the fair and effective administration of the tax laws. The Solicitor
General has an obligation, not just to try to win, but to pursue the fair
6

and effective application of the U.S. Code. Surely their endorsement
cannot be dismissed as if they were private litigants with only private
interests to pursue. Surely their endorsement supports the judgment
that Sotomayor’s approach did not, as Roberts’ claimed, “fly in the
face of the statute.”
For these reasons, I remain convinced that there are at least
two plausible interpretations of Section 67(e)(1) and that Roberts was
therefore wrong when he claimed that Sotomayor’s reading “flies in
the face of the statute.” Moreover, while either interpretation may be
plausible, Sotomayor’s makes it easier to administer the admittedly
cumbersome and awkward language of the statute. It is easier to
determine whether a cost could not have been incurred than whether
it would not customarily have been incurred. For reasons of
administrative feasibility, therefore, I prefer Sotomayor’s approach.
Prof. Kahn, on the other hand, prefers Roberts’ interpretation
because it would narrow the range of trust expenses to which Section
67(e)(1) would apply. This preference for Roberts’ approach
emanates from the fact that Prof. Kahn finds the Section 67(e)(1)
limits on deducting trust administrative costs to be wrong as a matter
of tax policy.
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On this question of tax policy, I fully agree. In order to produce
a true income figure, the administrative costs of a trust should be fully
deductible without limit. Section 67(e)(1) therefore ought to be
repealed. Disagreement with the policy or purpose of a statute,
however, is not a proper ground for interpreting the language of the
statute to limit its scope.
Prof. Kahn goes even further, suggesting that the courts should
have interpreted Section 67(e)(1), notwithstanding its language, to
permit a deduction in full for trust expenses for investment advice.6 I
am unsure how he would square that position on statutory
interpretation – which seems clearly to “fly in the face of the statute” –
with his disdain for Sotomayor’s reading of Section 67(e)(1).
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